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1.  Introduction 
Most macroeconomic models assume that retail bank interest rates adjust immediately to 
changes in monetary policy and money market interest rates. Some empirical research (see de 
Graeve et al. 2007 for a review) has challenged this assumption by showing that banks react 
incompletely and with a delay to monetary policy rate changes. However, existing research 
into this finding has so far focused on the incompleteness of the adjustment during an 
exogenously given time period rather than on the timing of the adjustment. Since a convincing 
model of monetary policy transmission would require information on both the incompleteness 
and the timing of the adjustment, solid micro-founded empirical evidence on the timing of 
interest rate adjustments is lacking. This is especially true after the global financial crises of 
2007-2009 underscored the pitfalls of omitting financial market frictions in macroeconomic 
modeling. 
In this paper we provide a first step in this direction by presenting a microeconometric 
analysis of the timing of retail interest rate changes and the determinants of that timing. First, 
we present descriptive evidence on the lumpiness of bank retail interest rate adjustments. 
Second, we apply duration analysis to retail interest rate dynamics. We use duration analysis 
to study periods over which retail interest rates remain fixed (“spells”) and the sources of 
variation in the duration of these spells both across and within different products.  
The existing literature on retail interest rate dynamics focuses either on the probability of a 
bank keeping its retail interest rates unchanged for a certain exogenously chosen period of 
time (Berger and Hannan 1991, Neumark and Sharpe 1992, and Mester and Sounders 1995) 
or on the incompleteness of retail interest rate adjustments to changes in monetary policy (see 
Hofmann and Mizen 2004, de Graeve et al. 2007, Kleimeier and Sander 2006, etc). The major 
disadvantage with the former is that its focus on exogenously given time periods (usually a 
month or a quarter) ignores the short- and long-term dynamics of retail interest rates. The 
latter strand of the literature is challenged by the fact that it uses techniques, such as vector 3 
 
autoregression analysis, that were originally designed for use with the time series structure of 
aggregate data. The smooth adjustment assumptions are too strong when imposed upon 
micro-level data, so that robustness of the results is not guaranteed. In particular, the linearity 
of cointegration implies a quadratic cost of adjusting the interest rate
1. The validity of this 
assumption has not been verified for the banking industry, but it has been rejected for 
numerous other industries in favor of a nonconvex adjustment costs assumption (see 
Caballero and Engel 2007 for a survey). The rejection of the quadratic adjustment costs 
assumption raises concerns about the reliability of cointegration-based estimates of price 
dynamics and has encouraged the implementation of alternative methodologies such as 
duration analysis for prices in industries other than banking (Alvarez et al. 2005, Nakamura 
and Steinsson, 2009). A detailed discussion of the functional form of interest rate adjustment 
costs and the related lumpiness of retail interest rate adjustments is to our knowledge still 
absent in the empirical banking literature.
2  
Our approach and data set allow us to investigate the form of adjustment costs, the hazard 
function of retail banking rate changes, and the dependency of the timing of rate changes on 
market structure as well as the dynamics of wholesale funding markets. By summarizing the 
descriptive statistics of micro-level retail interest rate dynamics, we document that retail 
interest rate adjustments for a broad set of retail bank products are very infrequent and large 
when they occur (much larger than the average magnitude of price changes for goods and 
services). The infrequency and large magnitude of retail rate changes suggest a high degree of 
lumpiness consistent with nonconvex adjustment costs. 
Moreover, the results of the duration analysis uncover a hump-shaped hazard function for 
changing an interest rate spell (for a range of deposit and loan products). This form of the 
estimated hazard function suggests that the conditional probability of changing the rate is 
                                                            
1 Hofmann and Mizen (2004) and De Graeve et al. (2007) relax the linear cointegration assumption and estimate 
nonlinear error-correction models as robustness checks. These still assume continuous adjustment, which is 
inconsistent with menu cost models.  
2 Arbatskaya and Baye (2004) is the only study we are aware of that employs hazard functions for the analysis of 
interest rate rigidity. These authors, however, focus only on mortgage rates offered online. 4 
 
increasing within the first few months after a change and decreasing afterwards, which is 
consistent with a fixed cost of interest rate adjustment.
3 In addition, the estimated covariate 
coefficients suggest (consistent with Berger and Hannan 1991, Neumark and Sharpe 1992) 
that banks’ reactions to changes in the money market rate or the monetary policy rate are 
strongly asymmetric: a drop in the wholesale rate accelerates a bank’s decision to change 
deposit rates, while a rise in the wholesale rate does not accelerate the decision to re-price 
deposit rates. The opposite is true for retail loan rates. This result suggests that market 
structure might affect retail interest rate inflexibility in addition to adjustment costs.  
Our data set provides a wide variety of variables with which we can measure not only the 
effect of market structure on interest rate adjustment, but also the dynamics of a change in 
market structure on the behavior of the adjustment, as the change in market structure is slowly 
incorporated into the policies of the affected banks. We find that the geographical scope of the 
bank (the number of markets where the bank operates) has a robust rigidity-increasing effect, 
while the effects of market share and bank size are mixed. Finally, we also take advantage of 
our high-frequency data to measure the effects of  the volatility of money market interest rates 
and market expectations as reflected in the yield curve. These have been previously ignored in 
the analysis of retail interest rate dynamics, and we show them to be as important in 
determining the duration of an interest rate spell as the cumulated change in the market rates 
or their level.  
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we precisely describe the lumpiness of 
bank retail interest rate adjustments. The implications of lumpy micro-level interest rate 
adjustments are not only relevant for understanding bank-level dynamics but they are also 
crucial for the estimation of the aggregate response to a monetary policy shock
4.  Second, we 
contribute to the interest rate pass-through literature by confirming its key micro-level results 
                                                            
3 Berger and Hannan (1991) propose a menu cost of interest rate adjustment, and, although menu costs can lead 
to a fixed cost of adjustment, by no means are they the only possible source. 
4 See Caballero, Engel, and Halitwanger (1995) for a discussion on the aggregate effect of lumpy micro level 
adjustments. 5 
 
using a less restrictive framework. Unlike the cointegration approach currently used to study 
interest rate dynamics, the use of the hazard functions involved in duration analysis implies 
less strict assumptions about the time series properties of the adjustment process and is thus 
closer to a structural approach. Also, the duration analysis allows us to include more control 
variables than we could within a cointegration framework. In particular, we can include 
changes in the levels of the monetary policy rate and money market rates, the volatility of 
these rates, and expectations about future interest rate levels manifested in the yield curve. 
Our third contribution is to the literature on price dynamics in general, which we make by 
analyzing a market with unusually broad data availability. To start with, data about prices 
(interest rates) are available on the bank-market level for a wide range of retail deposit and 
loan products. Next, those products (e.g., checking account deposits, MMDAs, credit card 
credit lines) are relatively homogeneous, but they are offered by multiple (and potentially 
heterogeneous) firms.
5 Moreover, the identification of input price shocks is more trivial in 
banking than in other industries, since interest rates in wholesale money markets (a widely 
used benchmark for bank funding costs) are publicly observable. And finally, interest rates are 
especially well suited to studying the asymmetry of price adjustments, since changes in 
monetary policy rates might go in either the upward or the downward direction.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a description of the 
frequency and duration of retail deposit and loan rate spells (that is, periods in which rates 
don’t change). In Section 3, we use hazard functions to analyze the duration of individual 
price spells, focusing in particular on the impact that changes in wholesale rates have on the 
probability that retail interest rates will change, bringing a spell to an end, and how this 
reaction is modified by bank and local market characteristics. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                            
5 We are therefore less concerned about misspecifications in the estimation of the price-duration models due the 
heterogeneity of the products (see Alvares et al. 2005 and Nakamura and Steinsson 2009 for a discussion). 6 
 
2.  Empirical Framework 
a.  Data 
Our dataset contains the deposit rates of 624 U.S. banks in 164 local markets (a total of 1,738 
bank-market groups) and the loan rates of 86 U.S. banks in 10 local markets (a total of 254 
bank-market groups) for the period starting September 19, 1997, and ending July 21, 2006. 
These rates are obtained from Bank Rate Monitor. Note that our deposit rate data 
encompasses by far the largest sample that has so far been employed in the study of the price 
dynamics of homogenous products. The loan rate data sample available to us is much smaller 
(though we are not aware of studies using larger samples of loan rates). Our loan rate sample 
encompasses only rates offered by the largest U.S. banks in the 10 largest banking markets 
(the MSAs of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, 
Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.). Because of the small sample size, bank 
and local market characteristics are likely to vary much less in our loan rate data than in our 
deposit rate sample.  
The time span of our data is the longest employed so far in a study of retail interest rate 
dynamics. The period encompasses a full interest rate cycle. The substantial upward and 
downward changes in the federal funds rate within this time period allow us to study the 
connection between retail and wholesale rate dynamics during a period with substantial 
wholesale rate variation. 
Bank Rate Monitor reports a comprehensive set of retail deposit products (checking accounts, 
money market deposit accounts, and certificates of deposits with maturities of three months to 
five years) and retail loan products (personal loans, fixed and variable rate credit cards, 
mortgages, home equity lines of credit (heloc), auto loans, etc.). Note that rates for these 
products are those offered to customers with the best credit rating with no other relation to the 
bank. Rates on products offered to existing customers might vary from the ones reported by 
Bank Rate Monitor.  7 
 
Interest rates for each product are given at a weekly frequency. The availability of weekly 
data allows us a more precise differentiation of the speed of adjustment compared to previous 
studies of interest rate rigidity (Berger and Hannan 1991 and Neumark and Sharpe 1992) and 
price rigidity (Bils and Klenow 2004 and Nakamura and Steinsson 2008), which use data at 
monthly or bimonthly frequencies.
6   
We enrich the dataset with a broad range of control variables for individual banks, taken from 
the Quarterly Reports of Conditions and Income (call reports). These are given with quarterly 
frequency (the end of each quarter). We also include control variables for the local markets. 
These data are taken from the Summary of Deposits and are available only at an annual 
frequency (reporting date is June 30).  
The banking literature presents some evidence that multimarket banks tend to offer uniform 
rates across local markets (Radecki 1998). However, in our sample we observe substantial 
variation in the deposit and loan rates offered by banks in different local markets. We 
therefore use the bank-market as the pricing unit and employ the variation of multimarket 
bank rates across local markets to identify the effect of market structure on interest rate 
dynamics
7.  
b.  Spells 
We set up the analysis of retail interest rate durations by defining an interest rate spell and the 
individual quote lines. We define the quote-linei,j,p as the set of interest rates offered by bank i 
in local market j for (deposit or loan) product p. The interest rate spell is defined as a 
subsection of the quote line for which the interest rate goes unchanged. The definition of the 
interest rate spell assumes that if the same interest rate is reported in two consecutive weeks, it 
                                                            
6To our knowledge, studies based on scanner data are the only ones with higher than monthly frequency. They, 
however, employ data from only a single retailer, although possibly in different markets (Eichenbaum, 
Jaimovich, and Rebello 2008).    
7 A bias can arise in the estimation if a bank-specific pricing effect impacts the pricing behavior in all local 
markets, since in this case the assumption of spherical standard errors can no longer be sustained. We account 
for potential bank-specific effects by estimating the hazard functions using a shared frailty technique (see 
Nakamura and Steinsson 2008 for a similar approach applied to control for heterogeneity across product groups). 8 
 
has not changed between observations. We define the number of weeks for which the interest 
rate goes unchanged as the duration of the interest rate spell.  
To avoid left censoring, we include only spells for which we can identify the exact starting 
date (the week for which a particular rate was offered for the first time). That is, for each 
bank-market we exclude all observations before the rate changes for the first time. A spell 
ends with either a change of the interest rate or with the exit of the bank-market unit from the 
observed sample. In the latter case, the issue of right censoring arises, which we will discuss 
later.  Bank Rate Monitor reports rates offered by smaller banks only if the quoted rate 
deviates from the rate quoted in the preceding week. To control for this, we assume that an 
interest rate spell “survives” through the weeks until the next observation is reported (if the 
next reported rate is in week t, we assume the rate has “survived” until week t-1). However, a 
few instances are present in our sample in which the bank-market unit exits the sample for a 
longer period (up two a few years) and re-enters the sample again. In this case, the assumption 
that observations are missing only because no change in the interest rate is observed is too 
strong. We control for this by treating an unreported rate as an unchanged rate only if the 
period of missing observations is less than 52 weeks
8.   
c.  Descriptive Statistics 
The average duration and the average change in the retail rates for each of the deposit and 
loan product categories are presented in Table 1. The data in this table illustrate the 
substantial variation that exists in the average duration of interest rates across different bank 
products, with checking account rates and money market deposit account rates being the most 
inflexible deposit rates
9 and personal loan rates and credit card rates being the most inflexible 
consumer loan rates. The average duration of checking account rates is 17.71 weeks (roughly 
                                                            
8 We did a few robustness checks here. For example, for the checking account rates our approach identifies 204 
spells for which the rate was not observed for a few weeks but reappeared with a changed value within 52 weeks. 
If we account only for rates that reappear within 26 weeks, we will identify 191 spells. If we impose no cut-off 
point with regard to the number of weeks a price was not observed, we have a total of 311 spells. 
9 The same has been found in the interest rate pass-through literature (see de Graeve et al. 2007). 9 
 
four months). Similarly, money market deposit account rates, personal loan rates, and fixed 
credit card rates change on average roughly every three months.  
An additional signal of the lumpiness of interest rate adjustments is the size of the average 
interest rate change. The second column of Table 1 presents the average absolute value of the 
interest rate change given a nonzero rate change.  
This average change in the rates is more informative when put into relation to the average 
value of the respective interest rate (e.g., the average change in the checking account rate 
seems very low in absolute value, 0.16, but this represents roughly a third of the average 
checking account rate). The fourth column of Table 1 presents the average absolute value of 
the changes relative to the average rates. For checking account rates the average size of the 
interest rate change is 30%. This average size of the interest rate change is much higher than 
the average price change documented for any good or service categories (excluding sales, see 
Nakamura and Steinsson 2008, who find the that highest average magnitude of regular price 
changes across all product groups is 21.6 %—for the product group “travel”). Similarly, the 
average size of money market deposit account rate changes is also very high, 24%. The 
average size of loan rate adjustments is likewise relatively high (12%), which also supports 
the notion of lumpy interest rate adjustment. 
Note that the average duration and change in the rates presented in Table 1 reflect all interest 
rate changes observed in the data. An important measurement issue in the analysis of price 
dynamics is the treatment of temporary price changes. In the price dynamics literature, 
temporary price reductions (sales) are considered an important link in the chain of the price-
setting mechanism (Bills and Klenow 2004 and Nakamura and Steinsson 2008). With regard 
to interest rate setting, the issue of temporary interest rate changes is more subtle. Whereas a 
change in the price of goods and services that is reversed after a few periods is usually 
classified as a sale, such automatic labelling is more controversial when applied to interest 
rates. To illustrate this subtlety, consider the case in which a bank has been slow to adjust its 10 
 
retail rates to an upward trend in wholesale rates, and it raises its retail rates only shortly 
before wholesale rates start declining. In this case, the reversion of the retail interest rate to its 
previous level can simply reflect the reaction to changes in the wholesale rate rather than a 
“sale.” Note that because interest rate values are usually rounded at 25 basis points, the 
probability of returning to exactly the same interest rate after a reversal in the level of the 
aggregate interest rate trend is high. Therefore, labelling any interest rate change reversed 
after a few weeks as a sale could be misleading. Nevertheless, we do observe a substantial 
number of interest rate changes which are reversed after a relatively short time. These could 
probably be considered “sales” in the classical price dynamic sense. With this in mind, we 
assume that only those changes that are reversed within four weeks are sales. The number of 
changes reversed within five, six, seven, and eight weeks is substantially lower, and we treat 
these as regular price changes (implying the end of an interest rate spell). Table 2 illustrates 
the number of temporary interest rate changes for some of the deposit and loan products. Note 
that the proportion of price spells reversed after a week is particularly high. It suggests that we 
might be dealing with measurement errors, due to misreporting of the rate in a particular 
week, rather than a de facto change in the interest rate.  
The distribution of the duration of spells for checking account and money market deposit 
account rates and personal loan and fixed credit card rates is presented in Chart 1 to Chart 4. 
In each of the charts the first panel shows the distribution when all interest rate changes are 
treated as the end of the spell (no reversals are excluded). The next panel shows the 
distribution when changes reversed within a week are not treated as the end of the spell 
(again, these reversals might reflect sales or measurement errors). The last panel excludes 
changes that are reversed within four weeks as an end to the spell.  
The distributions uncover the heterogeneity of the duration of interest rate spells within each 
deposit and loan product category. For all types of interest rates shown on these charts most 
have spell durations of less than year. However, for both deposit and loan rates a substantial 11 
 
portion of the spells last for two years and even longer. For example, if we focus on the 
second panel of the distribution charts (which does not treat rates reversed in one week as 
spell-ending), 237 out of 7,456 checking account rate spells last for more than 104 weeks. 
These are offered by 78 different banks. In the case of money market deposit account rates, 
197 out of 12,833 spells survive for more than two years. These are offered by 76 banks. For 
personal loan rates there are only 8 spells (out of 663) which last for more than two years, and 
these are offered by 8 different banks. And finally, 7 fixed credit card rate spells (out of 630) 
last longer than two years, and these are again offered by 7 different banks. Note that whereas 
some banks repeatedly offer very rigid rates for deposit accounts, this is not the case for loan 
rates. This difference could be due to our sample sizes. While the sample of banks for which 
we have deposit rates is relatively comprehensive, it is limited to the biggest banks in the case 
of loan rate data, and these banks are certainly less heterogeneous.  
We can summarize the descriptive statistics presented in this section in three key facts about 
retail interest rate dynamics. First, the variation of the mean duration of interest rates across 
different deposit and loan products is very high. While rates on certificate of deposits and 
mortgages change frequently, those on purely retail service products such as checking 
accounts, money market deposit accounts, personal loans, and credit cards are quite inflexible.  
In the rest of the paper we will focus on the dynamics of these less flexible deposit and loan 
rates. Note that these products are not of marginal importance for banks and consumers: with 
regard to deposits, checking accounts and money market deposit accounts are the major 
source of retail funding for U.S. banks; with regard to loans, personal loans and credit cards 
are the ones most closely related to private consumption of non-housing items.  
Second, the variation in the duration of interest rate spells is high within the individual deposit 
and loan products. A large share of spells end within one month, while a substantial share of 
the spells last for two and more years.  12 
 
Third, the average magnitude of an interest rate change is very large (much larger than the 
average magnitude of price changes for goods and services). This again supports the notion of 
lumpy interest rate adjustments
10.   
These findings square well with key findings about price rigidity (e.g., as summarized by 
Nakamura and Steinsson 2008) and point to some important similarities between price and 
interest rate adjustment.  
d.  Duration analysis 
We now turn to the analysis of hazard rates, which capture the probability of a given interest 
rate changing at a certain point in time. The hazard rate can be used to assess whether rates 
that have changed more recently are more likely to change than rates which have not changed 
for a long time. In other words, the hazard function plots the functional dependence between 
the time since the last interest rate change and the probability of a change of the rate. 
Formally, the hazard rate is expressed as:  
 
where  ) ( t T t T P   gives the probability that the retail interest rate will change in period t if 
it has survived until t-1. The hazard rate, also known as the conditional failure rate, is 
computed as:  
 
where  ) (t f  denotes the probability density function and   ) (t F  denotes the cumulative 
distribution function. 
The hazard rate’s property of plotting the functional relation between the conditional 
probability of a change in a price and the time since the latest price change has made it the 
                                                            
10 Unfortunately, we cannot compare our findings about interest rate rigidities with similar results from other 
countries  or time periods since none are available at this time. 










preferred empirical technique in the recent literature on price dynamics. Surprisingly, 
however, hazard rates have not yet been applied to interest rate dynamics
11.  
As mentioned in the introduction, existing studies on interest rate dynamics are based on 
either probit estimations of the probability of an interest rate change within an exogenously 
given time period or on estimating the cointegration between monetary policy and retail 
interest rates (Hofmann and Mizen 2004, de Graeve et al. 2007, Kleimeier and Sander 2003, 
etc). Compared to probit estimation of the probability of an interest rate change within an 
exogenously given time period, the hazard function provides richer information on the 
probability of a change within different subperiods of the “life” of an interest rate spell. It 
therefore avoids concerns about the choice of the period within which a change in the rate is 
observed. As already mentioned, the duration model imposes also less stark assumptions than 
cointegration frameworks. In particular, we do not have to assume quadratic adjustment costs, 
whereas this is a necessary cointegration assumption. The duration model therefore does not 
exclude by assumption the notion of a lumpy adjustment scheme (e.g., adjustment with menu 
costs of adjustment).  
Furthermore, by applying duration analysis to the dynamics of retail interest rates, we present 
results comparable to those from recent studies on the dynamics of prices of goods and 
services, which heavily rely on the estimation of the hazard functions to uncover price 
dynamics. The main challenge of this price dynamics literature has been the treatment of 
heterogeneity. The problem is that studies using micro-level price data in their quest for 
representative samples typically include heterogeneous products, some of which change 
prices frequently and some of which do not. The hazard rate in the first few periods will be 
high, reflecting the high risk of change in the flexibly priced product prices. The hazard rate 
drops after a few periods when all flexible prices have changed and the subsample of 
relatively sticky prices remains. In this case, the estimated hazard rate is downward sloping, 
                                                            
11 Arbatskaya and Baye (2004) is the only example presenting the hazard function of interest rate spells (in their 
case, online posted mortgage rates) we are aware of.  14 
 
whereas theories predict a flat or increasing hazard function. In our framework we have the 
advantage of exploring the “prices” (interest rates) of relatively homogenous products that 
still have a broad macroeconomic impact. Downward-sloping hazard functions might, 
however, still arise due to heterogeneity across bank pricing strategies (if we have a set of 
banks which reprice very often and some which reprice very infrequently, after a few periods 
we will be left with the long-lived spells of the infrequently adjusting banks and the form of 
the hazard function will be downward sloping).  
3.  Results  
A.  Unconditional duration dependence 
We start the examination of interest rate spell durations by presenting the nonparametric 
Kaplan-Meier estimation of the hazard functions for each of the more rigid deposit and loan 
rates. Chart 5 illustrates the nonparametric hazard rate estimation for the checking account, 
money market deposit account, the personal loan, and the fixed credit card rates, 
respectively
12. Despite the differences across the average duration of the spells across these 
products, a few similarities are obvious. For all four types of interest rates we observe an 
initially increasing hazard rate. After roughly half a year, hazard rates reach a local maximum 
and slowly decline before heading to a new maximum after roughly one and one-half years 
for credit card rates and roughly two years for personal loan, checking account, and money 
market deposit account rates.  
We interpret the estimated hump-shaped form of the hazard function as follows: during the 
first roughly six months the hazard of changing the interest rate is increasing. This is 
consistent with models of price dynamics with menu costs, which imply increasing hazard 
functions (see Nakamura and Steinsson 2009 and Alvarez et al. 2006 for a review of various 
                                                            
12 For the sake of parsimony we only present the hazard rates estimated on the samples that do not consider 
interest changes reversed after one week as ends of the interest rate spells. Estimates using the full sample of 
interest rate changes and those excluding sales with a duration of less than four weeks are qualitatively very 
similar to the presented hazard rates.  15 
 
hazard functions derived from alternative price-setting models)
13. After a period of roughly 
six months the largest portion of the spells in our sample has ended, the heterogeneity effect 
among the remaining spells dominates the menu cost effect and the hazard of changing the 
retail interest rate goes downward.  
The hump-shaped form of the hazard is not only relevant as evidence of a lumpy adjustment 
of interest rates (thus challenging the micro-foundations of partial adjustment models, which 
assume smooth rather than lumpy adjustment), but it also provides one of the few empirical 
examples of an increasing hazard function for a price change. 
Note that in these baseline estimations, we control for neither bank heterogeneity (across 
banks) nor changes in wholesale market interest rates. In the next section, we control for these 
by fitting a shared frailty model, and we present the resulting impact on estimated hazard 
rates. 
B.  Wholesale market rates and the probability of changing retail interest rates 
In this section, we explore the impact of wholesale interest rate dynamics - as a proxy for the 
dynamics of the marginal costs of bank products
14- on the hazard of changing individual bank 
rates. We use two different rates to represent the wholesale rate. First, we use the rate on 3-
month T-bills. Next, we employ the average effective federal funds rate as an alternative 
wholesale rate. The former is widely employed as a measure of the costs of bank wholesale 
funding (Berger and Hannan 1991, Neumark and Sharpe 1992, and Hutchison and Pennacchi 
                                                            
13 A menu cost model assumes that an interest rate change is delayed until the deviation of the current retail 
interest rate offered by the bank from the optimal retail interest rate goes beyond a trigger point, which is related 
to the menu cost of adjusting the retail interest rate. The probability that a bank will change a given retail interest 
rate is increasing in the menu cost model since the deviation of the current interest rate from an optimal interest 
rate is likely to increase with time. 
14 Simple theoretical models of banking predict a positive dependence between bank retail deposit and loan rates 
and wholesale money market rates (see Kiser 2003). These models assume that loans are the output in a 
production function that uses retail and wholesale funds as inputs. In other words, the effect of wholesale rate 
changes on loan rates is similar to the effect of changing input prices on the prices of final goods. The effect of 
wholesale rate changes in deposit rates is motivated by the substitutability of retail deposits and wholesale funds. 
An alternative view of the production function of the bank assumes that banks issue deposits and sell the 
accumulated funds in the wholesale market. In this case, the wholesale rate is the price of output, whereas the 
retail rate is the input price. In both frameworks, an exogenous rise in the wholesale rate is related to an increase 
in the optimal retail deposit and loan rates offered by the bank.  16 
 
1996). The latter is a proxy of the monetary policy rate and thus more relevant one from 
monetary policy transmission point of view.  
The Kaplan-Maier estimations presented in the preceding subsection are exclusively focused 
on the time dependency of retail interest rate changes. Time since the latest rate change can be 
strongly correlated with cumulated changes in observed and unobserved variables, reflecting a 
state-dependent interest-rate-setting mechanism. Therefore, we could only indirectly interpret 
the initially increasing hazard as consistent with state-dependent menu costs models. By 
including the cumulative changes of the wholesale interest rates as covariates, we introduce 
the first step in developing a model that explicitly controls for state-dependent interest rate 
setting
15. State-dependent-pricing schemes typically assume that the probability of a price 
change is determined by the deviation of the actual price from the optimal price.  
Because we do not observe the optimal price in practice, we use the change in the wholesale 
rate since the last observed change in the retail interest rate as a proxy for the deviation of the 
current rate from the optimal rate. Again, the wholesale rate serves as a proxy for the change 
in input costs, and, as is standard in S,s models, we assume that if a bank adjusts the interest 
rate, it adjusts to the optimal rate. An alternative approach assumes that the bank has an 
implicit optimal mark-up or mark-down of the retail interest rate relative to the wholesale rate 
and changes the retail rate when the deviation from this optimal mark-up is large enough.  
In our baseline model, we use the cumulative change of the wholesale rate (normalized by the 
value of the wholesale rate) since the last change of the retail rate (absolute change T-Bill rate 
or absolute change fed funds rate)
16 as a proxy for the deviation of the observed retail interest 
rate from the optimal retail interest rate. As a robustness check, we have rerun the estimations 
using the mark-up/mark-down (the difference between the wholesale and the retail rate) as a 
                                                            
15 In a follow-up project we focus on the state dependency of retail interest rate setting and explore its 
implications for aggregate interest rate dynamics. 
16 We plan to extend the analysis to modeling the nonlinearities in the reaction of the probability of changing 
retail rates to wholesale rate changes, as suggested by an S,s price adjustment, using splines of the wholesale rate 
change. This approach will allow us to estimate different coefficients of the hazard function covariates for 
different subsets of wholesale rate changes. 17 
 
proxy for the deviation of the observed from the desired interest rate. Results do not change 
qualitatively. To account for the asymmetry of adjustment (for the possibility that a positive 
wholesale rate effect has a different impact from a negative wholesale rate effect as shown by 
Berger and Hannan 1991), we generate dummy variables for positive changes in the 
wholesale rate in the loan rate regression (positive change dummy) and for negative changes 
in the wholesale rate in the deposit rate regressions (negative change dummy). We include 
these dummies together with their cross-products with the absolute cumulative change of the 
wholesale rate as covariates in the estimation of the hazard rate.  
The cumulative change of the wholesale rate is only a rough proxy for the deviation from the 
optimal retail interest rate. Other determinants of this optimal rate might be the level of the 
wholesale rate as well as its volatility and the expectation of the wholesale rate level in the 
future. We include these as additional covariates: the T-bill or fed funds rate as a proxy for the 
wholesale rate; the difference between the 10-year T-bill rate and the 3-month T-bill rate as a 
proxy for the expected interest rate (we term this difference the yield curve proxy) and the 
volatility of the wholesale rate, which is derived from a GARCH (1,1) model run on weekly 
observations of the wholesale rate
17. The importance of these other factors related to 
wholesale rate dynamics has so far been ignored in empirical analyses of retail interest rate 
dynamics, since they have focused on the response to changes in wholesale rates. We estimate 
the hazard functions using a lognormal hazard model. The choice of this parameterization is 
motivated by the nonmonotonic (first increasing and then decreasing) Kaplan-Maier estimates 
(see Chart 5), as well as the nonmonotonic baseline hazard function estimated from a 
semiparametric Cox model, including the full set of covariates, and the Akaike information 
criterion. (The results of the auxiliary estimations are very much like the parametric 
estimation results and are available from the authors upon request.) We estimate the 
                                                            
17 The GARCH process is estimated for the differences in logarithms of the rates, and in each case, all 
parameters are highly significant and are measured tightly.  GARCH-estimated parameters are available from the 
authors on request. 18 
 
parametric hazard models with shared frailty at the bank level to control for the possibility of 
bank-specific random effects in the interest-rate-changing mechanism
18.  
The results of these hazard estimations
19 are illustrated in Table 3 to Table 6. The most 
obvious implication of the estimation results is that there is a substantial difference in the 
reaction of deposit and loan rates to changes in the wholesale rate. In the case of deposit rates 
(both checking account rates and money market deposit account rates), the negative 
coefficient of the cross-product between the absolute change of the wholesale rate and the 
dummy for a negative wholesale rate change suggests that the probability of changing the 
deposit rate is increasing with the absolute value of negative wholesale rate changes
20. On the 
other hand, when wholesale rates are changing in an upward direction, banks are less likely to 
change their deposit rates (they postpone the adjustment). These results present very strong 
evidence of the asymmetric adjustment of deposit rates and confirm the implications of earlier 
studies based on simple probit and partial-adjustment models (Berger and Hannan 1991; 
Neumark and Sharpe 1992). They are consistent with a state-dependent adjustment to 
negative changes of the wholesale market rate
21.  
In the case of loan rates, the effect of the absolute value of the cumulative change in the 
wholesale rate is insignificant. The cross product of the cumulative change and the dummy for 
positive wholesale rate changes is statistically significant and points to a delayed adjustment. 
                                                            
18 Results of the estimations do not significantly change if we do not account for the bank-specific effect and if 
we include a bank-market random effect rather that a bank random effect. 
19 Here we present only estimation results based on the samples in which a spell is assumed to continue if it 
changes in week t but reverses to the same level in week t+1. The distribution of the spell durations and the 
nonparametric hazard estimations for these samples are presented in the middle subpanels of Charts 1 to 8. We 
have rerun all regressions using the full sample of failures and the sample of failures that are not reversed within 
four weeks. Results, which are qualitatively the same as the ones presented in the text, are available from the 
authors upon request.   
20 The lognormal hazard model is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates 
are interpreted as follows: if exp(-xjβx)>1, then time passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the 
probability of changing is higher. Given positive values of xj, a negative coefficient βx implies an increased 
probability of changing the retail interest rate. 
21 State-dependent price adjustment implies that microlevel price rigidity will not be
  reflected in delayed 
adjustment on the aggregate level (Caplin and Spulber 1987). Mojon (2000) presents evidence that aggregate 
deposit rates almost immediately adjust to negative changes in the money market rate.  19 
 
Although striking at a first glance, this adjustment path can be interpreted as a preference of 
banks to delay upward adjustments to personal loan and credit card rates. This preference 
could be caused by the substantial influence that high retail loan rates have on the probability 
of loan repayment, which might make banks cautious about the total effect of loan rate 
increases on expected returns from the loans (see Mester 1994 for a theoretical model on the 
rigidity of uncollateralized loan rates).  
For both deposit and loan rates, the effect of the level of the wholesale rate and its expected 
trend have a statistically significant impact with the predicted sign. So, for example, when 
wholesale rates are high or when a rise in the wholesale rates is expected, banks are less likely 
to adjust their deposit rates and more likely to adjust the loan rates. The volatility of the 
wholesale rate has a significant impact only on the probability of changing deposit rates, and 
this impact works in the direction of accelerated adjustment time. 
In sum, state-dependent adjustment could only be confirmed for deposit rates (and only for 
the case of adjusting to negative wholesale rate changes). The adjustment of loan rates to 
changes in wholesale market rates is particularly delayed when wholesale rates are increasing. 
Note that this delayed adjustment of loan rates to positive changes in the wholesale market 
rate, which is consistent with the theoretical model of Mester 1994, has not been emphasized 
in the existing empirical research. It implies the necessity of a more structural approach, 
which would incorporate the effect of interest rate changes on both loan demand and loan 
riskiness, which is a planned extension of this project. 
C.  Bank market structure and the probability of changing retail interest rates 
One of the potential sources for the heterogeneity of the reaction of interest rates to changes in 
the wholesale rates is market power. Models of price adjustment (e.g., Barro 1972 and   
Rotemberg and Saloner 1987) predict a higher frequency of price changes in markets with 
more competition because firms therein face more elastic demand. For the banking industry, 
Berger and Hannan (1991) model the positive relationship between market concentration and 20 
 
menu costs (and interest rate rigidity). Empirically, the positive relationship between market 
concentration and price rigidity has been shown in the case of markets for goods and services 
by Carlton (1986), Caucutt, Ghosh, and Kelton (1999), and Bils and Klenow (2004). In the 
case of bank retail interest rates, Berger and Hannan (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992), 
Mester and Saunder (1995), and de Graeve et al. (2007) present evidence of a positive 
relationship between market concentration and interest rate rigidity. A common result of these 
empirical studies using banking data is that market power allows banks to slow down the 
adjustment of deposit rates to positive wholesale rate changes and of loan rates to negative 
wholesale rate changes. 
To our knowledge the impact of market structure on the hazard of changing the price has not 
been explored yet. In this subsection we close this gap for the case of banking and extend the 
analysis from the previous exercise to include the impact of market characteristics on the 
duration of bank interest rate spells. The purpose is to reassess the robustness of the results of 
earlier studies on interest rate and price rigidity using the hazard rate rather than the 
probability of change within an exogenously given time period as a measure of price rigidity.  
We not only employ a new technique to the analysis, we also use a much richer set of data on 
market structure relative to earlier studies. The richness of our dataset allows us to distinguish 
between different proxies of market structure and market power in the estimation, whereas 
most of the literature uses a single market structure proxy (e.g., concentration ratio or 
Herfindahl index). In particular, we include the market share of the bank in the respective 
local market, as measured by the share of the bank’s retail deposits collected in the local 
market relative to the total volume of retail deposits issued by all banks in this local market. 
This is to control whether banks with a dominant market power adjust their interest rates less 
frequently. We also control for market concentration in each of the local markets, since 
market structure can affect the price setting of all banks operating in a market. To this end, we 
include the Herfindahl index as a covariate in the hazard function estimation. Moreover, we 21 
 
control for potential nonlinearities in the reaction of the hazard rates to market concentration 
and split the sample into interest rates in highly concentrated bank markets and less-
concentrated markets. The split is based on the Herfindahl index threshold of 1800 basis 
points, which is employed by the U.S. Department of Justice for the evaluation of the 
concentration effect of bank mergers. We also control for the number of local markets in 
which a bank operates. This is to control for the effect of the so-called linked oligopoly 
hypothesis, which posits that firms operating in numerous markets will adjust prices in each 
market less frequently, fearing revenge from competitors in all other markets.  
We also control for a number of bank characteristics which might affect the speed of interest 
rate adjustment. In particular, we control for the total size of the bank, measured by the 
national logarithm of its total assets. The effect of bank size can be ambiguous. On the one 
hand, if menu costs have a lump-sum component at the bank level, larger banks may be more 
likely to frequently adjust prices. On the other hand, larger banks bundle different sets of 
products, and the customers’ switching costs away from a larger bank may be higher, so the 
size of the bank can have an additional pro-rigidity effect apart from the market share. On the 
bank level, we also include the equity-to-total-assets and the liquid-to–total-assets ratios as 
controls because, as argued in the credit channel literature, better capitalized and more liquid 
banks might react less to monetary policy contractions (Kashyap and Rajan 2000)
22. To avoid 
endogeneity concerns, all bank variable values stem from the Call Report of the preceding 
quarter and all market variables from the previous year’s Summary of Deposits.  
In the estimation of the effect of market structure and bank characteristics on the probability 
of changing interest rates, we build upon the model presented in subsection A and add the 
market structure and bank-specific variables to the set of covariates. As in the previous 
subsection, we estimate a parametric duration model, assuming a lognormal distribution of the 
                                                            
22 De Graeve et al. (2007) find that both liquidity and capitalization significantly affect the cointegration relation 
between bank retail and wholesale market rates. 22 
 
baseline hazard rate. Again, we control for bank-specific random effects by estimating the 
model with shared frailties at the individual bank level.  
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 7 to Table 10. With regard to the 
estimations of the probability of changing the deposit rate, we find that the number of markets 
significantly decreases the probability. Adding an additional market “slows” the time to the 
change in the retail rate by roughly 1.3%. In other words, banks which operate in numerous 
local markets have stickier prices than banks with a more narrow geographic scope. This 
result is consistent with the linked oligopoly hypothesis, which argues that firms operating in 
many markets adjust prices less frequently. Bank size has no significant impact on the 
probability of changing money market deposit account rates and mildly increases the 
probability of changing the checking account rate. This result could be caused by the opposite 
effect of a lump-sum component of the adjustment costs and the unwillingness of larger banks 
to reprice products because of product bundling. The positive impact of market share on price 
rigidity is confirmed in the case of MMDA rates: banks with a larger market share adjust their 
MMDA rates less frequently. However, the economic significance of this effect is small (10 
percentage points of difference in market share imply a deceleration of the time to change by 
about 1.36%). The effect of market concentration is economically more important: 10 
percentage points of difference in the Herfindahl index imply a deceleration of the time to 
change by about 7.3%). Checking account rate hazard rates do not react to market share and 
market concentration. 
Note that the coefficients of the bank and market variables are insignificant in the loan rate 
regressions. We presume that this is the case because our loan rate sample is much smaller 
than our deposit rate sample. Also, because the sample covers only very large banks in major 
banking markets, the variation in terms of bank size, market share, number of markets, and 
market concentration is not sufficient to for tight coefficient estimation. However, it could 
also be due to an intrinsic difference between loan- and deposit-rate-setting processes. To 23 
 
shed more light on the most likely source of this deviation (significant impact of market 
structure on the deposit rate dynamics, no effect of market structure on loan rate dynamics) 
we re-estimate the hazard rates for checking and money market deposit account rates but only 
for the subsample of banks and markets for which we have loan rate observations. In this 
experiment, all wholesale rate variables turned out with statistically significant coefficients, 
similar to those estimated from the full deposit-rate sample. However, none of the banks or 
local market characteristics entered with a statistically significant coefficient. These variables’ 
lack of significance is, therefore, most likely due to the limited scope of the sample. The 
comparison of the estimations based on the different samples underscores the importance of 
using comprehensive samples and casts doubt on the results of studies which only focus on 
subsamples of the market, e.g. Hofmann and Mizen, 2004. 
In sum, our results suggest that standard bank and market variables explain some of the 
heterogeneity of deposit rate adjustments. However, the effect of these variables on the 
frequency of adjustment is much smaller than the one predicted by earlier studies (Berger and 
Hannan 1991 predict that the probability of changing the rate within a month is roughly 60% 
smaller if the market share increases by 10 percentage points, but we find that time to change 
is decelerated by a mere 1.3%). In our sample, the rigidity of retail rates depends on the 
concentration of the market rather than on the market share of the individual bank. Due to the 
limited scope of the sample, we find no evidence on the effect of bank and market 
characteristics on loan-rate dynamics.  
D.  Bank mergers and the probability of changing retail interest rates 
In this subsection we extend the analysis of the impact of bank market structure on interest 
rate duration by exploring the effect of bank mergers on the hazard of changing the retail 
interest rate. Focusing on the effect of mergers can strengthen the identification by easing 
concerns about the endogeneity of market structure with regard to interest rate dynamics as 
well as concerns about an omitted variable bias.  24 
 
In the estimation of the effect of bank mergers on the hazard of changing retail interest rates 
we adopt the approach presented in Craig and Dinger (2009). Due to degree-of-freedom 
limitations, we perform only the estimations for checking account and money market deposit 
account rates where we have a sufficient number of spell observations and variation of market 
and bank characteristics. Data on bank mergers are drawn (as in Craig and Dinger 2009) from 
the Supervisory Master File of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions. 
Bank mergers can affect interest rate dynamics by changing the size of the bank, its market 
share in markets where both the acquiring and the target banks were previously active, as well 
as by expanding the number of markets in which a bank operates. To estimate the impact of 
the merged banks’ size (target’s size), we include the volume of total assets of the target 
bank
23 (normalized to the acquirer’s total assets) in the regression. To control for the effect of 
changes in market share, we include the change of market share (CMS) caused by the merger. 
Because we do not have precise data on changes in market share directly related to individual 
mergers for each of the affected local markets, we have to approximate them with changes in 
market share realized in the year of the merger. That is, we approximate changes in market 
share caused by a merger as the difference between a bank’s market share in the years before 
and after a merger and normalize by the market share of the acquiring bank before the 
merger
24. In order to estimate the effect of the market-extension dimension of the mergers, we 
include the change in the number of local markets (CNM), divided by the number of markets 
prior to the merger as a regressor. As with the CMS, we have to approximate the CNM, which 
we do with the ratio of the number of markets in which a bank operates in the years before 







To consider the evolution of a merger effect, we account for a period from one year before the 
merger date
25 to up to ten years after the merger. We approximate the development of the 
rates around the merger by linear spline interpolation, the simplest form of spline 
interpolation
26.  It is equivalent to piecewise linear interpolation, where the function to be 
modeled is divided into a fixed number of subintervals, and within each of the subintervals 
the function is linearly approximated. Nonlinearity can, therefore, be modeled by different 
slopes of the linear functions across the subintervals.  The end points of the linearly 
approximated subintervals are known as “knots.”  
Algebraically, each spline is a linear function constructed as: 
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             =                 0, otherwise,            (12) 
and where x is the value of the explanatory variable (the time distance to the merger, in our 
case).  The values  i x  denote the “knots” of the spline, and the coefficients,  i  , are estimated 
from the data. In our case, we approximate the impact of a merger on the change in deposit 
rates by dividing the time period around the merger into several subperiods. We fix the knots, 
i x , at six months before the merger date, at the merger date, six months, one year, one and 
one-half years, two years, three years, and four years after the merger. Through the splines we 
model the potential nonlinearity of the dependence between deposit-rate changes and time 
after the merger.  
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 11 and Table 12. The estimated 





qualitatively the same as those presented in Table 7 and Table 8. With regard to the merger 
effects, we find that the expansion in geographical scope (measured by CNM) has a 
statistically significant effect of reducing the frequency of changing retail rates for both 
checking accounts and money market deposit accounts. Target size and the change in local 
market share significantly reduce the probability of changing the rate only in the case of 
mergers in less-concentrated local markets. This result suggests that the degree of interest rate 
inflexibility in concentrated markets is not further accelerated by mergers involving major 
banks. The fact that bank mergers result in less flexible prices is mostly driven by the fact that 
mergers increase the geographical scope of banks and thus complicate the linkages between 
multimarket banks’ pricing across different local markets. These findings about the effects of 
mergers square well with the effects of bank size, the number of markets, and market share on 
retail-rate durations, which we documented in the previous subsection. 
With regard to the time to the merger, we find almost no statistically significant effect on the 
probability to change MMDA rates. The effect of mergers on the hazard of changing checking 
account rates is negative in the pre-merger period (lower probability of changing rates), mixed 
in the first two years after the merger, and negative again in the longer-term period. 
4.  Conclusion 
We present results on retail interest rate dynamics that add to the literature in two dimensions, 
one data related, and one technical. Our data combine weekly observations of individual 
banks operating in 165 separate markets. Our technique is to analyze the timing of changes in 
retail interest rates through statistical duration analysis. Our results justify both the richer data 
and the more sophisticated technique. Most current studies analyze retail interest rate 
dynamics with cointegration techniques, which rely on the assumption that the process of 
adjusting interest rates is approximately smooth, especially around periods of no price change. 27 
 
In other words, the bank usually adjusts its retail rates in each period, even if these 
adjustments are moderately small.  
Our study shows most emphatically that, for some products, retail interest rate adjustments do 
not occur in the vast majority of periods, and when they do occur, they can be quite large. 
Given this lumpiness of the adjustment process, we employ more sophisticated hazard-based-
estimation techniques to analyze the determinants of the timing of retail rate changes. The 
hazard-based estimations lead to results that both differ from these studies and are richer.     
Our results show that retail interest rates such as checking account rates, money market 
deposit account rates, personal loan rates, and fixed credit card rates have a mean duration in 
the range of 3 to 4 months. The form of the estimated hazard function implies an initially 
increasing slope of the hazard, which is consistent with the lumpy adjustment of interest rates, 
which in turn challenges the use of partial adjustment and cointegration models in the analysis 
of retail interest rate dynamics. We confirm (consistent with earlier studies) that the effect of 
money market interest rates dynamics on retail interest rates is strongly asymmetric. Also, we 
show a significant impact of previously omitted variables, such as the volatility of money 
market rates and interest rate expectations.  
Our results also show a statistically significant impact of market structure on the speed of 
adjustment. The economic significance of this impact is, however, much lower than the one 
suggested by earlier studies based on the estimation of probit models (Berger and Hannan 
1991). In turn, the geographical scope of a bank, whose effect on retail interest rate rigidity 
has not been explored so far, is shown to have a robust rigidity-increasing effect. In particular, 
the rigidity of retail rates is strongly enhanced after bank mergers, implying broad geographic 
expansion of the bank. 
Our analysis in this paper could be characterized as “reduced form” in the sense that the 
estimates have few structural interpretations. However, the hazard functions that we estimate 
provide a point of departure to a variety of continuous time models, which are appropriate to 28 
 
the high-frequency data that we have. Many of our explanatory variables, such as the 
volatility of the wholesale rate, which we have shown to be important drivers of the price 
formation process, can be readily modeled in a continuous time context, and these models 
already have many representatives in the investment literature. The simple probits previously 
used to estimate cross-sectional effects are less directly translated to the continuous-time 
behavioral models and are more likely to be sensitive to ad hoc assumptions about the length 
of an arbitrary time period.  Further, because our results suggest an importance of unobserved 
heterogeneity in the determination of price changes, our estimating approach can easily be 
expanded to include unobserved heterogeneity of a known parametric form.  
All of this suggests that duration analysis, along with our high-frequency data, can be an 
important first step towards a structural model of the behavior of interest-rate determination. 
Potentially, these results point to important similarities between the microeconometric 
properties of price and interest-rate dynamics that can be employed for the modeling of the 
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cheching account 17.71 0.16 0.53 0.30
MMDA 12.76 0.26 1.07 0.24
CD 3 months 7.87 0.33 2.33 0.14
CD 12 months 6.08 0.35 2.96 0.12
loans
auto loan 9.87 0.87 7.67 0.11
arm 1 year 4.88 0.52 3.82 0.14
heloc 8.15 0.60 12.32 0.05
mortgage 15 years 3.34 0.25 5.83 0.04
personal  11.13 1.47 12.32 0.12
fixed credit card 10.08 0.87 7.56 0.12  
Source: Own computations based on BankRate Monitor data 31 
 

























cheching account 8084 5714 628 149 107 70
MMDA 14433 11814 1600 240 257 103
loans
personal  797 642 134 48 20 12
fixed credit card 709 565 79 21 12 15 






error Coefficient standard error
absolute change wholesale rate 1.324 *** 0.214 2.110 *** 0.215
dummy for negative change ‐0.042 0.043 0.045 0.044
negative change*absolute change ‐2.069 *** 0.130 ‐4.092 *** 0.256
wholesale rate 0.199 *** 0.030 0.099 *** 0.027
yield curve 0.205 *** 0.041 0.141 *** 0.040
wholesale rate volatility ‐0.006 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 0.000
# Observations 159762 2.403563
# spells  7405 7405
LR Chi(2) 797.9 521.89
wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
 
Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells 
considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model 
is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if exp(-
xjβx)>1, then time passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. 
Given positive values of xj, a negative coefficient βx implies an increased probability of changing the retail 






error Coefficient standard error
absolute change wholesale rate 2.558 *** 0.160 3.549 *** 0.149
dummy for negative change 0.402 *** 0.028 0.493 *** 0.029
negative change*absolute change ‐2.801 *** 0.112 ‐5.979 *** 0.199
wholesale rate  0.096 *** 0.018 0.024 0.017
yield curve 0.143 *** 0.025 0.092 *** 0.025
wholesale rate volatility ‐0.007 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000
# Observations 184531 184531
# spells  12815 12815
LR Chi(2) 1392.67 944.71
wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
 
Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells 
considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model 
is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if exp(-
xjβx)>1, then time passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. 











absolute change wholesale rate 0.437 0.382 ‐0.251 0.323
dummy for positive change ‐0.949 *** 0.094 ‐1.070 *** 0.098
positive change*absolute change 1.864 *** 0.467 3.175 *** 0.335
wholesale rate ‐0.017 0.072 ‐0.086 0.064
yield curve ‐0.079 0.090 ‐0.100 0.085
wholesale rate volatility 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
# Observations 5582 5582
# spells  625 625
LR Chi(2) 83.77 123.37
wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3 month  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
 
Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells 
considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model 
is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if exp(-
xjβx)>1, then time passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. 











absolute change wholesale rate 1.335 *** 0.290 0.384 *** 0.297
dummy for positive change ‐0.624 *** 0.094 ‐0.706 *** 0.104
positive change*absolute change 3.069 *** 0.560 15.437 *** 1.527
wholesale rate ‐0.254 *** 0.069 ‐0.256 *** 0.066
yield curve ‐0.383 *** 0.098 ‐0.387 *** 0.099
wholesale rate volatility ‐0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
# Observations 5185 5185
# spells  625 625
LR Chi(2) 84.11 117.76
wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
 
Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells 
considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model 
is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if       
exp(-xjβx)>1, then time passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. 
Given positive values of xj, a negative coefficient βx implies an increased probability of changing the retail 
















absolute change wholesale rate 1.344 *** 0.228 2.459 *** 0.237 1.733 *** 0.422 2.622 *** 0.464 1.424 *** 0.274 2.421 *** 0.276
dummy for negative change ‐0.032 0.045 0.104 ** 0.049 -0.022 0.088 0.050 0.092 -0.081 0.057 0.131 ** 0.058
negative change*absolute change ‐2.013 *** 0.135 -4.412 *** 0.276 ‐1.946 *** 0.239 ‐4.382 *** 0.525 ‐2.260 *** 0.166 ‐4.466 *** 0.325
wholesale rate 0.245 *** 0.031 0.198 *** 0.029 0.303 *** 0.059 0.208 *** 0.055 0.307 *** 0.039 0.192 *** 0.034
yield curve 0.283 *** 0.043 0.306 *** 0.044 0.354 *** 0.083 0.301 *** 0.083 0.361 *** 0.053 0.308 *** 0.052
wholesale rate volatility ‐0.006 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 ‐76.185 *** 11.368 0.000 *** 0.000 ‐49.060 *** 8.335 0.000 *** 0.000
bank size ‐0.060 ** 0.032 ‐0.073 *** 0.021 ‐0.010 0.038 ‐0.026 0.038 ‐0.078 *** 0.028 ‐0.088 *** 0.026
herfindahl ‐0.457 0.318 ‐0.711 ** 0.283
market share  0.029 0.226 0.285 0.196 ‐0.161 0.267 ‐0.115 0.262 0.567 * 0.307 0.539 * 0.290
number of markets 0.013 *** 0.003 0.014 *** 0.002 0.008 *** 0.003 0.009 *** 0.003 0.014 *** 0.002 0.015 *** 0.002
# Observations 138652 138652 40629 40629 98023 98023
# spells  6483 6483 1967 1967 4754 4754
LR Chi(2) 736.37 638.71 247.74 162.98 684.99 481.84
full sample highly concentrated markets less concentrated markets
wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds  wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds  wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed 
 
Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as 
spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if       exp(-xjβx)>1, then time 
passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. Given positive values of xj, a negative coefficient βx implies an increased probability of 
















absolute change wholesale rate 2.149 *** 0.170 3.373 *** 0.161 1.479 *** 0.403 3.296 *** 0.345 1.473 *** 0.242 3.153 *** 0.213
dummy for negative change 0.395 *** 0.029 0.496 *** 0.031 0.552 *** 0.064 0.609 *** 0.068 0.558 *** 0.039 0.693 *** 0.043
negative change*absolute change ‐2.490 *** 0.114 -5.752 *** 0.212 ‐2.696 *** 0.244 ‐6.208 *** 0.461 ‐2.677 *** 0.152 ‐5.858 *** 0.278
wholesale rate 0.158 *** 0.020 0.085 *** 0.018 0.236 *** 0.040 0.216 *** 0.036 0.180 *** 0.025 0.151 *** 0.022
yield curve 0.251 *** 0.027 0.207 *** 0.027 0.280 *** 0.056 0.308 *** 0.054 0.234 *** 0.035 0.240 *** 0.034
wholesale rate volatility ‐0.008 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 ‐64.625 *** 7.809 ‐2.906 *** 0.547 ‐95.511 *** 4.841 ‐3.722 *** 0.333
bank size 0.013 0.020 ‐0.007 0.019 ‐0.057 ** 0.024 ‐0.049 ** 0.023 ‐0.057 *** 0.016 ‐0.054 *** 0.016
herfindahl 0.704 *** 0.186 0.561 *** 0.181
market share  0.075 0.140 0.136 *** 0.137 0.765 *** 0.188 0.669 *** 0.180 ‐0.218 0.187 ‐0.177 0.185
number of markets 0.007 *** 0.001 0.006 *** 0.001 0.010 *** 0.002 0.008 *** 0.002 0.010 *** 0.001 0.009 *** 0.001
# Observations 160188 160188 46302 46302 114211 114211
# spells  11216 11216 3690 3690 9271 9271
LR Chi(2) 1367.56 932.27 382.13 310.69 1173.1 740.36
full sample highly concentrated markets less concentrated markets
wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds  wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds 
 
Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as 
spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if       exp(-xjβx)>1, then time 
passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. Given positive values of xj, a negative coefficient βx implies an increased probability of 


















absolute change wholesale rate 0.382 0.385 ‐0.391 0.338 0.271 1.050 -0.219 0.778 0.429 0.407 -0.356 0.366
dummy for positive change ‐0.968 *** 0.100 ‐1.108 *** 0.106 -0.935 *** 0.236 -1.143 *** 0.252 -0.996 *** 0.113 -1.101 *** 0.122
positive change*absolute change 2.318 *** 0.528 3.922 *** 0.411 2.520 ** 1.054 3.662 *** 0.922 2.158 *** 0.634 3.979 *** 0.471
wholesale rate ‐0.020 0.080 -0.148 ** 0.075 -0.339 ** 0.173 ‐0.461 *** 0.168 0.018 0.092 ‐0.132 0.088
yield curve ‐0.075 0.103 -0.204 ** 0.105 -0.517 ** 0.229 ‐0.627 *** 0.246 ‐0.008 0.119 ‐0.157 0.123
wholesale rate volatility 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 7.125 44.942 0.000 0.000 9.863 15.906 0.000 0.000
bank size ‐0.083 0.076 -0.069 0.078 ‐0.045 0.208 ‐0.028 0.210 ‐0.034 0.071 ‐0.012 0.070
herfindahl ‐0.737 1.031 ‐0.695 1.016
market share  0.121 0.653 0.046 0.652 ‐0.043 1.119 0.554 1.184 0.428 0.753 0.445 0.746
number of markets ‐0.002 0.004 0.000 0.005 ‐0.004 0.008 ‐0.007 0.008 ‐0.009 0.003 ‐0.010 0.003
# Observations 4862 4862 1032 1032 3830 3830
# spells  532 532 118 118 421 421
LR Chi(2) 90.79 135.67 34.04 44.21 97.88 129.34
full sample highly concentrated markets less concentrated markets
wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed  wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds  wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed 
 
Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as 
spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if       exp(-xjβx)>1, then time 
passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. Given positive values of xj, a negative coefficient βx implies an increased probability of 


















absolute change wholesale rate 1.361 *** 0.292 0.498 * 0.284 0.565 0.914 0.736 0.654 ‐0.339 0.484 ‐0.833 ** 0.418
dummy for positive change ‐0.628 *** 0.096 ‐0.660 *** 0.106 ‐0.092 0.254 0.132 0.271 0.011 0.151 ‐0.216 0.154
positive change*absolute change 2.994 *** 0.574 15.265 *** 1.579 0.419 1.088 ‐0.511 3.302 ‐0.435 0.998 7.252 *** 1.944
wholesale rate ‐0.257 *** 0.072 ‐0.250 *** 0.068 ‐0.596 *** 0.194 ‐0.469 ** 0.197 ‐0.285 ** 0.111 ‐0.201 ** 0.096
yield curve ‐0.393 *** 0.099 ‐0.398 *** 0.101 ‐0.360 0.259 ‐0.240 0.286 ‐0.282 0.154 ‐0.184 0.147
wholesale rate volatility ‐0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 6.259 48.496 0.000 0.000 ‐27.862 * 15.924 0.000 ** 0.000
bank size 0.044 0.059 0.079 0.058 ‐0.063 0.279 0.091 0.285 0.279 *** 0.085 0.290 *** 0.080
herfindahl 0.234 0.793 ‐0.185 0.791
market share  ‐0.145 0.508 ‐0.271 0.506 ‐0.465 1.371 ‐1.051 1.387 ‐1.144 0.847 ‐1.321 * 0.798
number of markets ‐0.004 0.003 ‐0.005 * 0.003 ‐0.001 0.010 ‐0.007 0.011 ‐0.011 ** 0.004 ‐0.010 ** 0.004
# Observations 4982 4982 1035 1035 3947 3947
# spells  604 604 136 136 543 543
LR Chi(2) 92.03 118.19 36.82 36.24 48.3 58.27
full sample highly concentrated markets less concentrated markets
wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed  wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed  wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed 
 
Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as 
spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if       exp(-xjβx)>1, then time 
passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. Given positive values of xj, a negative coefficient βx implies an increased probability of 


















absolute change wholesale rate 1.388 *** 0.256 2.344 *** 0.262 2.784 *** 0.496 1.759 *** 0.470 1.243 *** 0.304 2.180 *** 0.306
dummy for negative change ‐0.020 0.052 0.172 *** 0.053 0.136 0.098 0.021 0.093 ‐0.037 ** 0.063 0.186 *** 0.063
negative change*absolute change ‐2.225 *** 0.150 ‐4.695 *** 0.308 ‐5.075 *** 0.582 ‐2.092 *** 0.261 ‐2.279 *** 0.182 ‐4.540 *** 0.360
wholesale rate 0.299 *** 0.036 0.179 *** 0.033 0.202 *** 0.061 0.310 *** 0.065 0.291 0.044 0.166 *** 0.039
yield curve 0.342 *** 0.049 0.278 *** 0.049 0.309 *** 0.091 0.365 *** 0.089 0.331 *** 0.059 0.266 *** 0.057
wholesale rate volatility ‐58.671 *** 7.411 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 ‐78.993 *** 12.337 ‐48.696 *** 9.207 0.000 *** 0.000
bank size ‐0.035 0.044 ‐0.082 * 0.043 ‐0.077 0.084 ‐0.040 0.084 ‐0.034 0.053 ‐0.094 * 0.051
market share  0.066 0.211 0.210 0.209 0.227 0.278 0.151 0.279 0.077 0.335 0.254 0.323
number of markets 0.011 0.002 0.012 *** 0.002 0.011 *** 0.004 0.010 *** 0.004 0.012 *** 0.002 0.013 *** 0.002
target size ‐0.006 0.032 0.019 0.030 0.003 0.065 ‐0.012 0.066 ‐0.009 0.036 0.024 0.035
change number of markets 0.226 *** 0.041 0.212 *** 0.039 0.242 *** 0.073 0.255 *** 0.074 0.226 *** 0.050 0.217 *** 0.047
change market share 0.755 0.569 0.507 0.550 1.830 ** 0.814 1.776 ** 0.789 ‐0.229 0.820 ‐0.396 0.774
spline-0.5 0.507 *** 0.183 0.500 *** 0.177 0.290 0.300 0.287 0.299 0.615 *** 0.229 0.565 ** 0.219
spline0 ‐0.153 0.112 ‐0.117 0.108 ‐0.509 *** 0.185 ‐0.554 *** 0.188 0.025 0.140 0.041 0.133
spline+0.5 ‐0.214 ** 0.108 ‐0.339 *** 0.103 ‐0.632 *** 0.179 ‐0.460 *** 0.182 ‐0.099 0.134 ‐0.223 * 0.125
spline+1 0.265 ** 0.115 0.310 *** 0.110 ‐0.057 0.194 ‐0.057 0.197 0.388 0.141 0.456 *** 0.133
spline+1. 5 ‐0.025 0.124 ‐0.020 0.120 ‐0.411 ** 0.212 ‐0.401 * 0.212 0.133 0.152 0.127 0.145
spline+2 0.586 *** 0.125 0.607 *** 0.120 0.439 ** 0.210 0.425 ** 0.212 0.642 *** 0.154 0.654 *** 0.146
spline+3 0.419 *** 0.115 0.426 *** 0.110 0.032 0.195 ‐0.003 0.196 0.597 *** 0.141 0.571 *** 0.134
spline+4 0.224 ** 0.099 0.198 ** 0.096 ‐0.218 0.186 ‐0.116 0.188 0.344 *** 0.117 0.344 *** 0.112
# Observations 114337 114337 33432 33432 80905 80905
# spells  5388 5388 1648 1648 3939 3939
LR Chi(2) 924.33 684.46 210.88 285.36 673.27 510.24
full sample of mergers highly concentrated markets




Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as 
spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if       exp(-xjβx)>1, then time 
passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. Given positive values of xj, a negative coefficient βx implies an increased probability of 


















absolute change wholesale rate 1.321 *** 0.231 3.136 *** 0.198 1.102 ** 0.462 3.187 *** 0.382 1.388 *** 0.265 3.096 *** 0.232
dummy for negative change 0.555 *** 0.037 0.668 *** 0.040 0.544 *** 0.073 0.635 *** 0.076 0.561 *** 0.043 0.679 *** 0.046
negative change*absolute change ‐2.739 *** 0.143 ‐5.959 *** 0.260 ‐2.883 *** 0.282 ‐6.543 *** 0.514 ‐2.657 *** 0.165 ‐5.716 *** 0.301
wholesale rate 0.166 *** 0.025 0.146 *** 0.022 0.175 *** 0.048 0.173 *** 0.042 0.162 *** 0.029 0.138 *** 0.025
yield curve 0.233 *** 0.033 0.248 *** 0.032 0.247 *** 0.065 0.292 *** 0.062 0.223 *** 0.039 0.230 *** 0.038
wholesale rate volatility ‐89.649 *** 4.547 ‐3.615 *** 0.315 ‐74.417 *** 8.639 ‐3.146 *** 0.602 ‐95.925 *** 5.348 ‐3.821 *** 0.370
bank size ‐0.115 *** 0.029 ‐0.111 *** 0.028 ‐0.080 0.060 ‐0.061 0.057 ‐0.126 *** 0.033 ‐0.121 *** 0.032
market share  0.546 *** 0.142 0.563 *** 0.137 0.897 *** 0.208 0.767 *** 0.196 0.096 0.206 0.167 0.203
number of markets 0.010 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.002 0.007 *** 0.002 0.010 *** 0.001 0.009 *** 0.001
target size 0.063 *** 0.021 0.065 *** 0.020 0.030 0.047 0.029 0.046 0.071 *** 0.024 0.073 ** 0.023
change number of markets 0.159 *** 0.027 0.134 *** 0.026 0.262 *** 0.057 0.225 *** 0.054 0.126 *** 0.031 0.105 *** 0.030
change market share 1.017 *** 0.389 0.871 *** 0.372 1.159 *0 . 6 0 81.003 *0 . 5 8 0 1.066 ** 0.520 0.847 * 0.499
spline-0.5 ‐0.085 0.112 ‐0.059 0.107 ‐0.044 0.211 ‐0.048 0.201 ‐0.115 0.131 ‐0.073 0.127
spline0 0.131 0.080 0.154 ** 0.077 ‐0.180 0.144 ‐0.143 0.136 0.255 ** 0.097 0.270 *** 0.093
spline+0.5 ‐0.290 *** 0.071 ‐0.289 *** 0.067 ‐0.343 *** 0.133 ‐0.378 *** 0.126 ‐0.279 *** 0.084 ‐0.258 *** 0.080
spline+1 ‐0.038 0.072 0.055 0.070 ‐0.287 ** 0.140 ‐0.217 0.133 0.066 0.085 0.162 ** 0.082
spline+1. 5 ‐0.283 *** 0.078 ‐0.291 *** 0.074 ‐0.457 *** 0.147 ‐0.462 *** 0.140 ‐0.226 ** 0.091 ‐0.230 *** 0.087
spline+2 0.110 0.075 0.080 0.072 0.261 *0 . 1 5 80.271 0.151 0.044 0.086 0.012 0.082
spline+3 ‐0.077 0.075 0.007 0.072 ‐0.442 *** 0.137 ‐0.341 *** 0.131 0.098 0.090 0.171 ** 0.087
spline+4 0.185 *** 0.063 0.180 *** 0.060 0.012 0.130 0.009 0.124 0.259 *** 0.072 0.253 *** 0.069
# Observations 132967 132967 38279 38279 94707 94707
# spells  10375 10375 2981 2981 7623 7623
LR Chi(2) 1393.61 935.04 397.33 321.11 1047.09 666.17
full sample of mergers highly concentrated markets less concentrated markets
wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds  wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds wholesale rate=T‐Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds 
 
Note: Lognormal parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as 
spell “ends”. The lognormal hazard model is an accelerated time-to-failure model, in which coefficients of the covariates are interpreted as follows: if       exp(-xjβx)>1, then time 
passes more quickly for the subject; in other words, the probability of changing is higher. Given positive values of xj, a negative coefficient βx implies an increased probability of 
changing the retail interest rate. Highly concentrated markets are defined as markets with Herfindahl index ≥0.18 (following the definition of the Department of Justice). 42 
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Note: Distribution of the duration of retail rates in weeks. 43 
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Note: Distribution of the duration of retail rates in weeks. 
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without changes reversed within four weeks
 
Note: Distribution of the duration of retail rates in weeks. 
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Note: Distribution of the duration of retail rates in weeks. 
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Chart 5: Kaplan-Maier hazard function estimates 
 
Note: Nonparametric Kaplan-Maier smoothed hazard estimates based on samples considering only interest rate 
changes that are not reversed within one week as ends of the spells. 